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Abstract
Coalitional presidentialism is a power-sharing strategy deployed in multiparty presidentialist democracies that entails the distribution of cabinet positions to coalition
partners to facilitate governability. This model of governance is increasingly common
worldwide, gaining growing scholarly interest. The consequences of coalitional presidentialism for women’s cabinet representation, however, have received scant attention. In this article, we provide a gendered analysis of the Brazilian experience with
coalitional presidentialism. Through the quantitative analysis of an original dataset
of all ministerial appointments (N = 597) under eight Brazilian presidents (1985–
2019) and a descriptive assessment of the coalitional dynamics during that period,
we evaluate the Brazilian experience with coalitional presidentialism through the
lens of Feminist Institutionalism. We show that coalitional presidentialism restricts
women’s access to cabinet seats, with the demands of multiparty coalition formation
and management often overriding presidential considerations about descriptive
representation, and coalition parties rarely advancing women to ﬁll portfolios allocated to them by the president.

1

University College London, London, UK
College of Saint Benedict and Saint John’s University, Saint Joseph, MN, USA
3
James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA, USA
2

Corresponding Author:
Malu A. C. Gatto, University College London, London, UK.
Email: m.gatto@ucl.ac.uk
Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without
further permission provided the original work is attributed as speciﬁed on the SAGE and Open Access page (https://us.
sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).

2

Journal of Politics in Latin America 0(0)

Resumen
El presidencialismo de coalición es una estrategia para compartir el poder desplegada en
democracias presidencialistas multipartidistas que implica la distribución de cargos ministeriales entre los partidos miembros de una coalición para facilitar la gobernabilidad.
Este modelo de gobernanza es cada vez más común en todo el mundo y gana cada
vez más interés académico. Sin embargo, las consecuencias del presidencialismo de
coalición para la representación de las mujeres en los ministerios han recibido poca
atención. En este artículo, proporcionamos un análisis de género de la experiencia
brasileña con el presidencialismo de coalición. A través del análisis cuantitativo de un
conjunto de datos original de todos los nombramientos ministeriales (N=597) bajo
ocho presidentes brasileños (1985-2019) y una evaluación descriptiva de la dinámica
coalicional durante ese período, evaluamos la experiencia brasileña con el presidencialismo de coalición a través de la lente de Institucionalismo Feminista. Mostramos que el
presidencialismo de coalición restringe el acceso de las mujeres a los puestos ministeriales: las demandas de formación y gestión de coaliciones multipartidistas que a menudo
anulan las consideraciones presidenciales sobre la representación descriptiva, mientras
los partidos de coalición rara vez promueven mujeres para ocupar los ministerios que
les asigna el presidente.
Manuscript received 14 May 2021; accepted 3 July 2022
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Introduction
Gender parity cabinets are on the rise, yielding acclaim in popular and academic accounts
alike. As of January 2021, thirteen countries have 50 per cent or more women in cabinet
positions. Yet the trend is far from universal; only 21.9 per cent of ministers around the
world are women (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2021). Brazil fares far below the global
average with women representing just 7.7 per cent of ministerial appointments
between 1985 and 2019.
Many constraints condition cabinet composition in highly fragmented multiparty
presidential systems such as Brazil’s, with governability concerns being prescient. In
the interest of managing executive–legislative relations and facilitating governance,
chief executives employ power-sharing strategies that include selectively distributing
cabinet posts as an enticing carrot to coalition partners (Batista, 2016). Scholarship on
coalitional presidentialism derived from and has been particularly insightful for the
Brazilian case, where no president has had more than 19.3 per cent co-partisans in the
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country’s lower legislative chamber since 1990. While Brazil is perhaps an extreme case
of coalitional presidentialism, this strategy of governance is becoming increasingly
common worldwide and has been employed to mediate executive–legislative relations
in presidentialist systems in Latin America, Africa, post-Soviet states, and beyond
(Chaisty et al., 2014, 2018).
As the coalitional presidentialism literature progresses into its third decade, with coalitional governments now the norm in democracies around the world, concerns over its
quid-pro-quo character abound. Largely missing from that conversation, however, are
considerations about how strategies deployed affect descriptive representation. What
are the implications of coalitional presidentialism for women’s cabinet representation?
And what factors condition women’s opportunities for cabinet appointment under governments employing this governance strategy?
The existing literature offers incomplete answers to these questions. Coalitional presidentialism scholars emphasise ministerial appointments as a tool to facilitate governance deployed by presidents in multiparty systems to attain a congressional majority
(Abranches, 1988). Central to this argument is the notion that chief executives’ appointments primarily reﬂect partisan afﬁliation requirements rather than demographic characteristics. On the other hand, comparative research on gender and cabinet representation
demonstrates the increasing salience of descriptive diversity (such as gender, race, ethnicity, and religiosity) in cabinet formation (Krook and O’Brien, 2012), with the inclusion
of women in cabinet positions now normalised and expected, in what Annesley et al.
(2019) theorise as a concrete ﬂoor. In parliamentary systems, achieving descriptive
representation is more challenging in coalition governments (Annesley et al., 2019).
How well do these insights travel to ministerial appointments under coalitional
presidentialism?
Whereas prime ministers are party leaders and representatives of their parties, presidents enjoy a source of legitimacy independent from their party due to the separate
origin of the executive in presidentialist systems. This has two core implications.
First, while presidents often enjoy extensive powers to change cabinet size and distribute seats to coalition partners, coalitional instability may impose a recurrent threat to
governance (Chaisty et al., 2014), restricting presidents’ ability to prioritise other
forms of representation (i.e. descriptive diversity). Second, presidents’ greater discretion comes with a cost: while prime ministers share responsibilities with their party
and coalition colleagues, under presidentialism, there is a “heightened attribution of
responsibility to a unipersonal executive” (Batista et al., 2022: 1; Samuels and
Shugart, 2010: 252).
In gendering coalitional presidentialism, we argue that cabinet formation and
management under coalitional presidentialism can have profound consequences
for women’s representation. Through the quantitative analysis of an original
dataset on the gender, political afﬁliation, and timing of all ministerial appointments
(N = 597) during the mandates of eight Brazilian presidents (1985–2019), and a
descriptive assessment of the coalitional dynamics under different presidential
terms during that period, we evaluate the Brazilian experience with coalitional
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presidentialism through the lens of Feminist Institutionalism (FI). Our analyses
reveal how selectorate capacity – or the ability of the president (and coalition
parties) to appoint ministers – and selectorate will to improve diversity drive
women’s cabinet representation.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that coalitional presidentialism encourages coalition partners to
ignore calls for gender representation, since responsibility for cabinet diversity tends to
be ascribed to the president. In the context of unstable coalitions, however, presidents
often prioritise partisan representation over descriptive representation. Presidents
willing to prioritise women’s representation have to bear the costs of their nomination
by incorporating them into their own party’s portfolios. Ultimately, governance concerns
still take precedence, with the number of cabinet posts available to presidents conditioning their capacity to nominate women.
In centring the representational consequences of coalitional presidentialism, this
article stands in contrast to most existing accounts, which have tended to emphasise
governability while neglecting other dimensions of the quality of democracy. In
employing a key case within the coalitional presidentialism literature (Chaisty et al.,
2018), this article also contributes to the literature on gender and cabinets by examining
cabinet dynamics in a country that provides an interesting representational puzzle: the
limited presence of women in legislative ofﬁce and subnational executives, but the election of a woman to the presidency – a position that grants its occupant the institutional
power to affect descriptive representation through the appointment of women to cabinet
positions.

Coalitional Presidentialism and Women’s Political
Representation: An Incongruous Match?
Presidential systems and parties have proliferated worldwide. By 2010, most democracies
had directly elected presidents, and the effective number of parties had increased from
2.94 in 1974 to 3.83 by 2005 (Chaisty et al., 2018). In most presidential and parliamentary systems, the parties of heads of government do not attain a majority of parliamentary
seat shares, so they form coalitions by distributing cabinet positions (Chaisty et al., 2014,
2018). In both systems, coalition formation procedures are bound not by set rules, but by
strongly institutionalised informal norms guiding the decisions of chief executives and
coalition partners (Annesley et al., 2019: 69).
While the role of political institutions in procedural dynamics such as cabinet formation and management has been widely studied, the role of gender as an institution has
received less attention. Gender, deﬁned as the social construction of identities that
signify power and hierarchy between men and women (Mackay et al., 2010), must be
understood as part of the institutional dynamics that shape and constrain behaviour. As
more women enter the political arena, navigating a space that was largely created by
men for men (Acker, 1992), scholars must consider how gender as a signiﬁer and as
an institution inﬂuences the political process.
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Coalitional Presidentialism
Multiparty presidentialist systems pose challenges to governability (Ames, 2002;
Mainwaring, 1999; Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Shugart and Carey, 1992). As
articulated in the coalitional presidentialism literature, presidents in such systems often
overcome those challenges by building and maintaining multiparty coalitions that can
cultivate a legislative majority, thus compensating for their own party’s minority
status, and facilitating their realisation of policy goals (Abranches, 1988; Cheibub
et al., 2004). Although presidents rely on other tools to synchronise the executive and
legislative agendas, the allocation of cabinet seats to coalition members is one of the
main strategies employed by presidents in exchange for parties’ electoral and legislative
support (Chaisty et al., 2018).
The president, like other actors engaging in coalition negotiation and formation, is
“severely constrained by institutional arrangements and prior commitments” (Strom
et al., 1994: 303). While the president is the central player in cabinet allocations, coalition parties use cabinet negotiations to further their political objectives, often wielding
considerable power in selecting appointees for the portfolios allocated to them (Lopez,
2015). Once presidents choose which party will lead each ministry, they may not have a
signiﬁcant say in who occupies positions allocated to parties other than their own
(Chaisty et al., 2018). The power of coalition parties thus constitutes a heavy constraint
on the president’s appointment powers (Annesley et al., 2019). In addition, while
inaugural cabinets tend to give formateurs a seat “bonus,” over time presidents often
lose personal capital, increasing the need to redistribute those seats to coalition partners
(Chaisty et al., 2018). The need to improve coalescence between parties’ legislative and
executive representation is likely to increase during political crises, when presidents’
popularity decreases and cabinet changes become a strategic defence tool
(Martínez-Gallardo, 2014; Pereira et al., 2005). Including women’s representation in
the calculation of cabinet formation and management adds a layer of complexity to
those negotiations.

Gender and Cabinet Representation
Research on the gendered dynamics of ministerial appointments has expanded the
domain of the women’s representation literature from legislatures to cabinets (Adams
et al., 2016; Annesley, 2015; Annesley et al., 2019; Beckwith, 2015; Claveria, 2014;
Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2016; Field, 2020; Franceschet and Thomas,
2015; Krook and O’Brien, 2012; Scherpereel et al., 2020; Siaroff, 2000; TaylorRobinson and Gleitz, 2018). Those studies demonstrate gendered inequities in the
overall process and distribution of cabinet posts, the types of positions allocated to
women, and the qualiﬁcations of appointees.
Particularly in systems that require executives to select their cabinet appointees from
the parliament, limited women’s legislative presence can constrain the appointment of
women (Adams et al., 2016, 2019; Scherpereel et al., 2020; Taylor-Robinson and
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Gleitz, 2018). Yet women’s legislative representation is neither a necessary nor sufﬁcient
condition for increasing women’s cabinet representation (Adams et al., 2016; Jacob et al.,
2014; Reyes-Housholder, 2016). This should be particularly true in systems like Brazil’s,
where ministers do not have to be legislators and can be recruited from positions beyond
political bodies – including industry and civil society.
Domestic and international norms are also salient, with attention to gender equity in
cabinet nominations by previous presidents or neighbouring leaders inducing path
dependence in women’s cabinet representation (Adams et al., 2016; Annesley et al.,
2019; Claveria, 2014; Reyes-Housholder, 2016). Over a decade ago, Escobar-Lemmon
and Taylor-Robinson (2005: 840) declared, “It is now unusual for a cabinet not to
have at least one woman of full ministerial rank.” As articulated by Annesley et al.
(2019), the institutionalisation of the international norm of gender equity in decision
making means that, in established democracies, ministerial appointments are now
subject to a concrete ﬂoor – the minimum number of women for the ministerial team
to be perceived as legitimate.

Gendering Coalitional Presidentialism
The Brazilian case presents an opportunity to investigate the implications of coalitional
presidentialism for women’s cabinet appointments. First, unlike many countries in the
world where the adoption of quotas has transformed the gendered composition of legislatures and party leadership (Hughes et al., 2019; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009), women’s legislative representation has remained largely constant over time even after the national
implementation of the quota law in 1998 and subsequent efforts to strengthen the
quota (Gatto and Wylie, 2021; Santos, 2021; Wylie et al., 2019). This provides a
stable context to isolate the effects of coalitional presidentialism – and not other
changes in the wider dynamics of women’s political representation – on women’s ministerial presence.
Importantly, the case of Brazil also yields variation in selectorates’ capacity and willingness to nominate women. This allows us to evaluate how coalitional presidentialism
dynamics inﬂuence presidents’ and coalition partners’ pursuit of women cabinet
members. We leverage descriptive insights from the Brazilian case to exemplify our ﬁndings. The election of Dilma Rousseff as the ﬁrst woman president in 2010 and her
re-election in 2014 allow us to examine the relationship between the gender of the
chief executive, commitments to increased women’s descriptive representation, and coalitional presidentialism constraints on cabinet formation and management. Rousseff’s
impeachment process in 2016 and the ascension of vice-president Michel Temer show
how a change in leadership can inﬂuence the appointment of women cabinet members
in times of crises. Finally, the election of right-wing president Jair Bolsonaro in 2018
allows us to consider whether a refusal to employ coalitional presidentialism opens
opportunities for women’s ministerial representation. The focus on gendered institutional
constraints under coalitional presidentialism makes a Feminist Institutionalist analysis the
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ideal theoretical approach to connecting gender, coalitional presidentialism, and cabinet
appointments.
Drawing from the New Institutionalist literature (March and Olsen, 1996; North, 1990;
Steinmo et al., 1992), FI centres on the role of gender in institutional development and
change, and how such gendered processes empower and constrain political actors
(Adams and Smrek, 2018; Mackay and Krook, 2011; Mackay et al., 2010; Waylen,
2014). While Annesley et al. (2019) apply FI to better understand the dynamics behind
cabinet appointments in seven countries (including two presidential systems), to our
knowledge there has been no work employing the framework to address the gendered
idiosyncrasies of coalitional presidentialism.
The key to understanding coalitional presidentialism in the context of FI is to place
gender at the centre of an analysis of cabinet allocation and coalitional dynamics, paying
close attention to the processes that inﬂuence the structural and agentic factors underlying
cabinet appointments. More speciﬁcally, we must understand how formal and informal
rules driving cabinet appointments may inﬂuence women and men in distinct ways,
leading to gendered opportunities and constraints on selectors and eligible nominees.
We argue that coalitional presidentialism dynamics – in particular, the necessity of
forming and managing multiparty coalitions – inﬂuence the capacity and will of selectors
to nominate women. Capacity speaks to presidential and coalition parties’ ability to
appoint cabinet members and its consequences for the nomination of women to
cabinet positions. Will relates to selectors’ own commitments (and the pressures they
face) to enhance women’s cabinet representation. Coalitional presidentialism dynamics
may independently shape capacity and will, and often inﬂuence both simultaneously.
Capacity and will may also be interdependent: changes in capacity may inﬂuence selectors’ will to nominate women; in turn, selectors’ own will (or will imposed by political
pressures) may motivate selectors to increase capacity. Finally, because responsibility
allocation is centred around presidents, the same factors may impact the capacity and
will of different selectors – namely, presidents and coalition partners – in distinct
ways. Understanding these complex dynamics is an important step towards better understanding the formal and informal constraints coalitional presidentialism poses to attempts
to increase cabinet diversity.
Drawing on the literature on the consequences of the district and party magnitude for
women’s representation (Matland and Studlar, 1996), we expect the relative scarcity of
appointments extended to each individual party in the coalition to come at the cost of
women’s appointment. Parties with one or few seats will likely nominate top party
leaders, who are typically men (Gatto and Thomé, 2020; Morgan and Hinojosa, 2018;
Wylie, 2018). Parties with more positions to distribute will have a greater capacity to
nominate ministers, and thus be better positioned to appoint women. Presidents are
likely to retain discretion over the largest share of cabinet seats and divvy up the remaining seats among coalition partners. Compared to the president’s party, coalition partners
thus tend to be allocated fewer cabinet portfolios, so we expect coalition partners to have
lower capacity and be less likely to nominate women ministers. Moreover, under coalitional presidentialism, presidents often do not have control over the selection of ministers
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for portfolios allocated to coalition partners. Yet presidents are still publicly viewed as
responsible for the overall representativeness of their cabinets, which should, in turn,
shape their will to nominate women. As such, we expect that nominations made for
the purposes of achieving higher descriptive representation will largely be absorbed by
seats over which the president has discretion – namely, those that are allocated to presidents’ co-partisans or to non-partisans. We hypothesise that:
H1: Women are more likely to be appointed when their party’s portfolio allocation is
high.
Previous research indicates that larger cabinets tend to have more women (Claveria,
2014). Presidents have the ability to create and terminate ministries, and as such,
cabinet size has varied greatly since the return to democracy in Brazil. This means that
when they have the will to nominate women, presidents are in a position to increase capacity through the creation of a new ministry.1 But while larger cabinets entail more positions to distribute, more seats overall do not necessarily result in more positions for each
party in the coalition and may instead reﬂect a president’s need to build a larger (but more
fragmented) coalition to maintain governance. The gendered implications of cabinet size
are thus not straightforward: on the one hand, cabinet size may reﬂect a president’s
attempt to increase their capacity to nominate women; on the other hand, it may reﬂect
their need to accommodate demands from a greater number of coalition parties, thus reducing their capacity to appoint women. We outline alternative hypotheses:
H2a: Women are more likely to be appointed when the cabinet size is high.
H2b: Women are less likely to be appointed when cabinet size is high.
We also expect that concerns of descriptive representation will be heightened in presidents’ widely publicised and photographed inaugural cabinets, which tend to be
subject to greater societal scrutiny than reshufﬂed cabinets. Earlier in their terms, presidents’ recent electoral success tends to yield greater legitimacy and popularity, which typically grants the formateur a seat “bonus,” in turn improving their capacity to nominate
women. This timing consideration should be particularly important for seats under presidential discretion.
H3: Women are less likely to be appointed later in presidential terms.
Annesley et al. (2019) delineate experiential criteria as inﬂuential for women’s
cabinet appointments. An important manifestation of experiential criteria is
women’s political experience; if women are not represented in the legislature, their
likelihood of cabinet representation will be diminished. Under coalitional presidentialism, women’s legislative representation may increase the capacity (supply of
experienced women to occupy cabinet posts) and will (pressures from women
co-partisans) of formateurs to nominate women. Although women have held no
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more than 15 per cent of seats in the lower house during the years under observation
(1985–2019) that aggregate ﬁgure obscures substantial interparty variation that may
offer explanatory power for understanding ministerial representation. As such, we
expect that:
H4: Women are more likely to be appointed by parties with higher shares of women
legislators.
Women’s appointments are likely shaped not only by presidents’ and coalition partners’ varied capacity to nominate women, but also by formateurs’ will to increase
descriptive representation. In Brazil and elsewhere, leftist parties have historically
been more supportive (at least rhetorically) of gender equity than non-leftist parties
(Kittilson, 2006; Wylie, 2018; but see Funk et al., 2017). Because of their party’s commitment to gender equity and/or their own identities or personal networks, some presidents may be more willing than others to make intentional efforts to nominate women to
cabinets. Since Brazil’s return to democracy, only two presidents hailed from a party
with an institutionalised commitment to women’s representation: Luiz Inácio da
Silva (popularly known as Lula) and Dilma Rousseff, both from the Workers’ Party
(PT). We also expect women presidents to have a larger network of trusted women political actors and a greater will to nominate women (Annesley et al., 2019; Barnes and
O’Brien, 2018; Krook and O’Brien, 2012; Reyes-Housholder, 2016), particularly for
cabinet posts under presidential discretion. Finally, building on the concrete ﬂoor discussion (Annesley et al., 2019), we expect women’s cabinet representation to be path
dependent, with prior levels of women ministers increasing societal expectations for
cabinet diversity, in turn increasing pressures for presidents to appoint women.
We expect that:
H5: Women are more likely to be appointed to portfolios held by leftist parties.
H6: Women are more likely to be appointed by a woman president.
H7: Women are more likely to be appointed after other women ministers have been
appointed.

Data and Method
Previous coalitional presidentialism studies have been mostly concerned with legislative
and executive partisan coalescence (Amorim Neto, 1998; Chaisty et al., 2018). As a
result, existing datasets normally track the allocation of ministries, but do not contain information on ministers.2 Our focus on women’s descriptive representation thus led us to
compile an original dataset that includes all 597 ministers appointed between 1985 and
2019, encompassing the full ministerial compositions of ten administrations (seven presidents), as well as the inaugural cabinet of Jair Bolsonaro (elected in 2018). We include
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all titular ministers listed by the Ofﬁce of the Presidency, excluding individuals who served
as interims.3 Descriptive statistics for all variables are available in Appendix A.
Our study seeks to understand how selectors’ capacity and will under coalitional presidentialism inﬂuence the individual-level appointments of women. Our main dependent
variable indicates ministers’ gender. This variable takes a value of one when the minister
is a woman and a value of zero otherwise. Women account for forty-six (7.71 per cent) of
our observations.
To test H1, we employ the measure party portfolio allocation, which captures the total
number of cabinet positions a minister’s party has at the time of their appointment. For
ministers in portfolios under presidential discretion (i.e. who belong to the president’s
party or are non-partisan), party portfolio allocation is equal to the sum of cabinet
posts allocated to the president’s party and to non-partisans in the inaugural cabinet.
As previously detailed, we expect this measure to affect women’s nominations through
formateurs’ capacity.
Another set of variables shapes the capacity and will to appoint women. We test H2a
and H2b with the variable cabinet size, which corresponds to the number of ministries
during each presidential term. To account for the timing of appointments (H3), we
employ the variable days since inauguration, counting the number of days between
the president’s inauguration and the minister’s appointment. We test H4 with the
number of women deputies in ministers’ respective parties.4 Given that ministers
without partisan afﬁliation are chosen by the president, we assign the number of
women in the president’s party to ministers without ofﬁcial partisan afﬁliation.
We assess the will to appoint women by controlling for three variables. Party left-right
ideology is from Power and Zucco Jr. (2009) and Power and Rodrigues-Silveira (2019),
which use national legislators’ survey responses on political parties’ reputation in legislative behaviour to calculate an ideological score for each political party operating in
Brazil in the period between 1991 and 2019. We assign the ideology score of the president’s party to non-partisan ministers (H5). Second, to examine whether the president’s
gender shapes their will to nominate women (H6), we employ a binary variable that
takes a value of one for those appointed under Rousseff and zero otherwise. Third, to
account for whether women’s appointments are inﬂuenced by a previously established
“concrete ﬂoor” (H7) and changing normative demands for women’s representation,
we control for gendered cabinets, which measure the share of cabinet seats occupied
by women in the previous administration.
Because presidents and coalition partners have different roles in building and managing coalitions, we expect the above factors to shape the capacity and will of each
type of selector to appoint women distinctly. To account for whether a cabinet seat is
under the president’s discretion, we code a binary variable which equals one for ministers
who are members of the president’s party or those who have no publicly available partisan afﬁliation5 and zero for ministers afﬁliated to a party that is a coalition partner. This
variable is highly correlated with other coalitional dynamics (e.g. number of portfolios
and cabinet size), so, instead of including it as an independent variable in our model,
we use it to estimate models restricted to appointments made under presidents’ discretion.
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Table 1. Coalitional Presidentialism Dynamics and Women’s Cabinet Appointments, Logistic
Models.
Model 1

Model 2
All

Portfolios

Constant

10.120
(22.650)

1.057+
(0.031)
0.763**
(0.080)
0.999**
(0.000)
0.967
(0.076)
0.506
(0.578)
8.654*
(7.469)
1.032
(0.046)
0.877*
(0.054)
37.140
(100.700)

N
Pseudo R-squared

597
0.174

597
0.185

Cabinet size
Days since inauguration
Women congress
Left-right ideology
Rousseff
Gendered cabinet

1.079*
(0.037)
0.786**
(0.070)
0.999*
(0.000)
1.025
(0.072)
0.104**
(0.084)
7.615*
(7.007)
1.038
(0.055)

Portfolios × left-right ideology

Model 3
Model 4
President’s discretion
1.077*
(0.040)
0.775*
(0.099)
0.999**
(0.000)
0.960
(0.086)
0.0382*
(0.053)
8.392*
(7.205)
1.017
(0.056)

22.210
(70.180)

1.032
(0.040)
0.796+
(0.100)
0.999**
(0.000)
0.926
(0.089)
0.210
(0.443)
7.608*
(6.106)
1.007
(0.047)
0.902
(0.087)
26.150
(82.730)

412
0.141

412
0.144

Note: Exponentiated (odds ratio) coefﬁcients. Constant estimates baseline odds. Coefﬁcients above 1 indicate
higher odds of association between an independent variable and the outcome (i.e. a positive relationship).
Coefﬁcients below 1 indicate lower odds of association between an independent variable and the outcome.
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for nine presidential term clusters. +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01,
***p < .001 (two-tailed). Unit of analysis is the ministerial appointment.

These models allow us to examine whether the above-detailed factors operate differently
when only considering appointments made by presidents.

Analysis
We test our hypotheses with logistic regressions with standard errors clustered by presidential term. Table 1 summarises our results from two full models of all cases and two
models restricted to ministers appointed to seats under a president’s discretion.
As shown in Table 1, variables associated with both capacity and will inﬂuence
women’s cabinet representation. H1 anticipated that the number of portfolios allocated
to a given party would increase the prospects of women’s nomination. Indeed, as portfolio allocation increases from one to twenty-four (the maximum number of portfolios
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under a president’s discretion or allocated to a single party) and other variables are held at
their means (for model 1), the predicted probability that a woman is a nominee increases
from 1.2 per cent to 6.9 per cent. The variable produces statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of similar magnitude for the unrestricted and restricted models (models 1 and 3).
But portfolio allocations vary widely, with coalition partners having an average allocation of 2.5 cabinet seats, while presidents hold an average of 19.4 seats under their discretion. As such, although the inﬂuence of portfolio allocation on women’s appointment
seems substantively small, the large discrepancy between the number of portfolios held
by presidents and coalition partners means that different selectors have distinct levels of
capacity to appoint women – and that variation in portfolio allocation is most consequential for appointments under presidential discretion, where the vast majority of women’s
ministerial appointments occur.
Because of its potential to affect capacity and will and, in turn, shape women’s likelihood of appointment in different directions, we outlined alternative hypotheses for
cabinet size. Our results indicate support for H2b and show that, as cabinet size increases,
the likelihood of women’s appointment decreases – suggesting that cabinet size increases
tend to accommodate demands of coalitional (i.e. partisan) representation, not descriptive
diversity. Indeed, and aligned with the literature on coalitional presidentialism, bivariate
analyses suggest that cabinet size is positively correlated with cabinet fragmentation6
(the number of parties in a coalition) (Pearson’s r = 0.424***) but is not correlated
with portfolio allocation – an indication that presidents likely inﬂate their cabinets to
bring more parties to the table without compromising the number of portfolios they
can allocate to their own party or key coalition partners.
The timing of appointments also affects selectorate capacity and will to appoint
women (H3), with days since inauguration exercising a negative effect on the probability
that a minister is a woman. Pressures to appoint women are typically greatest in widely
publicised inaugural cabinets, precisely when formateurs generally enjoy their greatest
latitude. Once the honeymoon period expires, cabinet shufﬂes tend to be motivated by
partisan concerns rather than descriptive representation.
Our expectation that women’s appointment prospects would be greater in parties with
more women deputies (H4) was not supported. This null ﬁnding points to correlations
between this variable and two of our covariates that shape will: Left-right ideology and
Rousseff, both of which are statistically signiﬁcant.
We stipulated three hypotheses about selectorate will, with mixed ﬁndings. As anticipated in H5, leftist ideology is associated with an increase in the likelihood of women’s
appointment: holding other variables at their means (for model 1), the likelihood of
women’s appointment for a party in the far-left (with an ideology score of−1) is 23.5
per cent; this falls to 3.1 per cent for parties at the centre (with an ideology score of 0)
and to 0.03 per cent for parties at the far-right (with an ideology score of 1).7 The predicted effect of ideology is more pronounced in our restricted model, with the likelihood
of the minister appointed being a woman falling from 48.7 per cent for left-wing presidents with an ideology score of −1 to 0.14 per cent for far-right presidents with a
score of 1.
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Figure 1. Likelihood of Appointment Being a Woman When Capacity (Portfolios) Interacts With
Will (Left-Right Ideology).
Note: The unit of analysis is a ministerial appointment. The ﬁgure displays results from model 1,
which is a logistic regression with standard errors clustered by presidential term. It illustrates the
predicted probability of the ministerial appointment being a woman, as the number of portfolios
and the scale of left-right ideology increase and all other variables are held at their means.

Rousseff’s presidential terms are also associated with a higher likelihood of
women’s appointment, as outlined in H6. With other variables at their means (for
model 1), the predicted probability of women’s appointment in other presidential
terms was 2.2 per cent; under Rousseff, the likelihood that a minister was a woman
was 14.4 per cent. Unsurprisingly, the variable’s effect is more substantively pronounced in our restricted model, which only accounts for seats under presidential discretion. For model 3, the predicted likelihood of the appointee being a woman
increases from 3.8 per cent to 24.9 per cent under Rousseff; this indicates that
Brazil’s ﬁrst woman president had a greater level of capacity to nominate women to
posts to which she had full control.
Contrary to expectations implied by the “concrete ﬂoor” concept (H7), the precedent
of more gender-egalitarian cabinets does not increase the likelihood that a minister is a
woman. Women’s cabinet representation in Brazil has instead followed the “see-saw”
pattern articulated in Scherpereel et al. (2020), corresponding to selectors’ ﬂuctuating
capacity and will. As we discuss, however, pressures to diversify the all-white male
cabinet put in place after Rousseff’s impeachment anecdotally suggest that a “concrete
ﬂoor” may be brewing in Brazil.
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Figure 2. Ministerial Distribution by Ministers’ Gender, President’s Discretion Status, and
Presidency.
Note: In the left-side panel, dark grey bars show the number of portfolios under the president’s
discretion and light grey bars show the total number of women ministers appointed to seats under
the president’s discretion during each presidential term. In the right-side panel, bars provide the
same information for cabinet seats allocated to coalition partners. Cabinet size and portfolio
allocation often change during presidential terms, so, for both panels, we report the mean number
of portfolios. Note that data on ministers appointed by Bolsonaro are right-censored and only
cover his inaugural cabinet (1 January 2019).

Finally, we assess how the positive effects of a greater will to appoint women ministers
interact with selectorate capacity with the interaction term, portfolios-left-right ideology.
Results are illustrative of our theoretical expectations about the interactions between capacity
and will: as summarised by model 2, the interaction is statistically signiﬁcant, the main effect
of portfolios becomes more tenuous than in model 1, and the main effect of left-right ideology loses statistical signiﬁcance, suggesting that the positive inﬂuence of selectors’ capacity
on women’s appointment prospects hinges on selectors’ will to appoint women. Figure 1
displays the predicted probabilities of this interaction, revealing that the boost portfolio allocation offers to women’s ministerial prospects holds only for leftist parties.

Discussion
A descriptive assessment of women’s appointments in different presidential terms provides deeper insight into the mechanisms through which the factors uncovered in our
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models as statistically signiﬁcant shape women’s likelihood of appointment, and illuminates how capacity and will interact on the ground.
As shown in Figure 2, presidents have discretion over a much higher number of portfolios than coalition partners. This gives presidents greater capacity to accommodate
women. In addition, since parties tend to use ministerial positions as a reward for their
most senior leaders, the underrepresentation of women in most parties’ leadership structures (Araújo et al., 2018; Wylie, 2018; Wylie and dos Santos, 2016) decreases their
chances of being the chosen representatives of their parties’ interests in a cabinet coalition
– with presidents claiming to have no power over who occupies seats allocated to parties
other than their own. As such, while women ministers have also come from non-partisan,
technocratic backgrounds, women have always represented a paltry share of nominations
from coalition partners.
In fact, just three out of the total forty-six women ministers8 are from coalition parties
(Kátia Abreu, Luislinda Valois, and Teresa Cristina), with all three hailing from the coalition party allocated the highest number of cabinet positions. In line with H1 and reinforcing our ﬁnding on the statistical signiﬁcance of portfolio allocation, coalition parties
with scarce portfolio allocations are unlikely to give them to women. Having access to
a relatively large number of portfolios approximates a necessary condition for
women’s cabinet appointments. But capacity is insufﬁcient for women’s cabinet appointments; will is also necessary.
The near exclusion of women from cabinet positions during the ﬁrst ﬁve presidencies
of Brazil’s present democratic era indicates that the space has historically been a masculinist one and that formateur will has been critical for women’s cabinet representation.
Between 1985 and 2002, women occupied no more than 5 per cent of cabinet positions.
Tellingly, in his 1998 speech to celebrate International Women’s Day, Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, who as president at the time had power over cabinet appointments,
stated that “perhaps one day women will be ministers” and will be able to share political
power (Folha de São Paulo, 1998).
Upon taking ofﬁce in 2003, Lula more than doubled the previous maximum share of
women’s cabinet representation by appointing seven women and reaching 10.6 per cent
of women in his ﬁrst-term cabinet and maintaining this commitment during his second
term, again nominating seven women (10.1 per cent of all nominations). Lula was
likely encouraged by party leadership and his advisors to include more women in his
cabinet appointments (dos Santos and Jalalzai, 2021): the left-wing PT pioneered a
party gender quota in 1991 and has remained at the forefront of initiatives to promote
women’s representation (Godinho, 1996; Wylie, 2018). This is also consistent with
our ﬁndings that left-wing ideology increases women’s likelihood of appointment –
even when controlling for Rousseff, Brazil’s only woman president and also a PT
member. Aligned with our statistical ﬁndings about portfolio allocation, the higher
number of women ministers under Lula (compared to previous administrations) came
not from coalition parties but through presidential discretion. Of the nine (unique)
women appointed to a cabinet position during his two administrations, eight were from
the PT, and one had no party afﬁliation.
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Rousseff’s election as Brazil’s ﬁrst woman president placed her in a position to
promote women’s leadership, an agenda she publicly accepted and actively supported
(dos Santos and Jalalzai, 2021; Jalalzai and dos Santos, 2015). During her ﬁrst term as
president, Rousseff tried to appoint as many women as possible (Diniz Alves, 2010;
dos Santos and Jalalzai, 2021; Jens Glüsing, 2012). As Gilberto Carvalho, one of
Rousseff’s top aides explained: “Given a choice between a man and a woman with the
same qualiﬁcations, she prefers to hire the woman” (Jens Glüsing, 2012). Her ministers
reafﬁrmed this idea: Ideli Salvatti, who was appointed to various cabinet positions under
Rousseff, stated that the president “was ﬁrm on nominating about ten women ministers to
compose her cabinet of trust” (dos Santos and Jalalzai, 2021: 73).
Rousseff’s actions reinforce the importance of will for women’s appointments. Indeed,
Rousseff was responsible for nominating the most women-inclusive cabinet in Brazilian
history: nine women were nominated to her inaugural cabinet, 25 per cent of all cabinet
posts. The inaugural cabinet presented Rousseff with the most opportune moment for
appointing women ministers, given the mandate conferred by her recent election. As
the country’s ﬁrst woman president, the visual of her inaugural cabinet represented a
poignant manifestation of her deviation from the white, male norm of embodied political
power in Brazil. This is picked up by our statistical models: the controls for Rousseff and
days since inauguration produce positive and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients. Still,
Rousseff fell short of feminist expectations. In total, Rousseff nominated fourteen
women during her ﬁrst term, 18.7 per cent of all nominations. As was the case with
Lula, all women Rousseff nominated in her ﬁrst term were either from the PT or had
no party afﬁliation, meaning their appointment did not appease coalitional demands.
Despite her strong will, Rousseff’s capacity to nominate women was curtailed in her
(short) second term in ofﬁce (see Figure 2), which ended abruptly with her impeachment
in August 2016. After a contested electoral win in 2014, Rousseff began her second
term with less bargaining power, with her party losing sixteen seats in the lower house
of Congress. The political crisis not only increased Rousseff’s reliance on her coalition partners, but also constrained internal party dynamics (Sousa Braga, 2018). Rousseff’s cabinet
appointments had to satisfy both coalitional demands and different PT factions.
In responding to pressures from coalitional partners and her own party, Rousseff
started her second term by keeping discretion over 35 per cent of the cabinet seats and
distributing the remaining seats to coalitional partners. The need to galvanise PT
support across an increasingly divided party meant that Rousseff had to distribute ministerial appointments to key PT factions. Since women’s cabinet representation under coalitional presidentialism is so reliant on the availability of seats under presidential
discretion, the need to appease PT factions hindered Rousseff’s capacity to nominate
women (Fagundez and Mendonça, 2016).
This led to a considerable decrease in women’s cabinet representation: Rousseff
appointed only six women (15 per cent) to her second-term inaugural cabinet. Of those
women, ﬁve occupied seats under Rousseff’s discretion – four were from the PT, and
one had no party afﬁliation. The sixth, Kátia Abreu (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock,
and Supply), was from a key coalition partner (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party,
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PMDB), and the only woman from a coalition party to be nominated during Rousseff’s two
terms. Yet according to multiple sources, Abreu’s name was not proposed by the PMDB
leadership, but rather, was a decision made by Rousseff (Azedo, 2017; dos Santos and
Jalalzai, 2021). Abreu’s nomination to a prestigious ministry thus neither satisﬁed PT supporters’ demands (who strongly opposed Abreu’s connections to agroindustry), nor did it
comply with the demands of her largest coalition partner. Instead, this appointment represents an example of Rousseff’s will to subvert coalitional presidentialism’s constraints and
nominate a woman she trusted (despite ideological differences).
As Rousseff’s second term in ofﬁce progressed, the crisis deepened, and her government’s survival rested on continued support from coalition partners (Sousa Braga, 2018).
Rousseff reduced the number of cabinet posts – a reform that, among other changes,
merged the Ministry of Women’s Rights, Secretariat for Women, and Secretariat for
Racial Equality – all led by women ministers – into a single ministry. Rousseff’s
reforms removed three of six women from her inaugural cabinet.
Upon taking ofﬁce following Rousseff’s impeachment, Temer intensiﬁed efforts to
signal his willingness to respond to legislators’ demands and promote executive–legislative cohesiveness. To do this, he immediately reduced the number of cabinet seats from
thirty-two to twenty-three – notably extinguishing the ministerial-status Secretariat for
Women – and then distributed portfolios to eleven of the twenty-six parties with seats
in the National Congress, still maintaining twelve seats (46 per cent) under his discretion:
six posts for members of his party (PMDB), and another six for non-partisans. For comparison, in Rousseff’s ﬁrst inaugural cabinet, there were thirty-six portfolios, with twelve
(33 per cent) under Rousseff’s discretion.
Despite having the capacity to do, none of the twelve portfolios under Temer’s presidential discretion went to women. The exclusion of women from Temer’s cabinet corresponds
to our ﬁndings above, which suggest that leftist parties and women presidents are more
likely to appoint women ministers. Attempting to justify the nomination of an all-white
male inaugural cabinet, Temer’s Chief of Staff blamed coalition partners, claiming that
the government initially received no women nominees from coalition parties and was
unable to ﬁnd women willing to serve as ministers with such short notice (Amorim et al.,
2016). Transferring responsibility to coalition partners did not work, suggesting that
accountability for poor gender and racial descriptive representation may fall on the president.
Under continued public pressure to diversify his cabinet, Temer then re-established
the previously extinguished Ministry of Human Rights and appointed Luislinda
Valois, an Afro-Brazilian woman from the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB),
a major coalition partner (Paraguassu and Goy, 2017). Responding to criticism for the
lack of representation of women and Afro-Brazilians in his cabinet, Temer made a
single nomination that neither required the replacement of a white man nor otherwise
threatened to disrupt the established coalitional agreements – a “complementarity
bonus” tactic often used by elites in efforts to diversify representation while minimising
costs (Celis et al., 2014).
Elected as an anti-system, far-right president, Bolsonaro’s initial approach to the presidency included a vocal rejection of coalitional presidentialism. Aligned with his call for a
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new way of doing politics, Bolsonaro received the formal support of only one political
party, with seven other parties pledging informal support for the president (Martins,
2018). In 2019, Bolsonaro’s governing coalition in Congress was thus neither large
nor stable enough to facilitate governability (Cerioni and Caleiro, 2019). In his inaugural
cabinet of twenty-two portfolios, ﬁfteen remained under Bolsonaro’s discretion. The high
share of portfolios under the president’s discretion, combined with Bolsonaro’s public
disregard for nominating a cabinet that could ensure governability meant that he had
the capacity to nominate women.
But Bolsonaro lacked the will, nominating a single woman to portfolios under his discretion: Damares Alves, a conservative evangelical pastor, who he appointed to lead the
rebranded Ministry of Women, Family, and Human Rights. The only other woman in his
cabinet was Teresa Cristina,9 nominated to lead the Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply
Ministry and the third woman from a coalition partner to ever occupy a ministry in
Brazil. Despite the low number of women in his cabinet, Bolsonaro rejected criticisms
of women’s underrepresentation. In fact, in a speech on International Women’s Day,
he claimed: “For the ﬁrst time, the number of women and women ministers is balanced
in the government. […] Each of these women that are here is equivalent to 10 men”
(Mazui and Netto, 2019).
In sum, the appointment of women requires both capacity and will from selectors. As a
result of capacity constraints under coalitional presidentialism in Brazil’s highly fragmented party system, women are most often absorbed into seats under the president’s discretion, with such appointments highly dependent on political will. Having the plurality of
portfolios under their discretion, presidents often have the capacity to appoint women; in
these cases, it is the president’s willingness to nominate women that matters. Conversely,
having few portfolios to distribute to their top elites, coalition partners rarely have the
capacity to nominate women. When the portfolio allocation of willing selectors increases,
so does the likelihood of women’s nomination.

Conclusion
Multiparty presidential systems have become more common worldwide. With independent
elections to the executive and legislative branches, presidents whose parties lack a majority
rely on coalitional presidentialism to improve governance. While women’s ministerial
representation has been widely studied across other systems, existing scholarship had
not yet examined the gendered implications of coalitional presidentialism governance strategies. Our analyses show that while coalitional presidentialism and the nature of electoral
politics in Brazil – the driving forces in the political calculations behind cabinet allocation –
are not institutions that explicitly bar women from these positions of power, the gendered
dynamics that dictate coalition formation and management work to create formal and informal barriers to entry in this historically male-dominated environment.
As indicated in our statistical analyses, capacity and will shape selectors’ likelihood of
nominating women. The number of cabinet seats allocated to any given coalition member
is scarce, so seats are generally allocated to the most inﬂuential political leaders in coalition
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parties; women’s absence from party leadership positions thus also has implications for their
cabinet nominations. As a result, women’s appointments are largely restricted to seats over
which presidents have discretion – and, as such, hinge upon the number of seats over which
presidents have discretion, as well as the presidents’ will to nominate women, which is conditioned by timing, left-wing ideology, and access to women’s networks.
As we reveal in our assessments of coalitional dynamics under different presidencies,
the PT’s rise to power was accompanied by a noticeable increase in women’s cabinet
nominations. The presence of a woman in Brazil’s most powerful position also had a
transformative impact on the nomination of women to cabinet: Rousseff’s presidency
saw nearly as many women nominated to the cabinet as all previous presidencies combined. Nevertheless, as the PT’s congressional seat share diminished in her second
term, and as the institutional crisis widened, Rousseff’s ability to nominate her preferred
cabinet members was severely curtailed.
Contrasting Rousseff’s and Temer’s cabinet formation experiences result in an institutional paradox: while Rousseff’s willingness to promote women was tempered by coalitional presidentialism demands, Temer’s strategy of partisan coalescence was checked
by representational pressures related to the blatant gender imbalance in his initial cabinet.
This provides a silver lining and suggests that Lula’s and Rousseff’s efforts to nominate
women meant that Temer had to halt his decision to nominate an all-male cabinet – even
as he publicly lamented the coalitional constraints that complicated his effort. This possibly indicates a “concrete ﬂoor” for women’s representation. Bolsonaro’s initial cabinet
was arguably less restricted by coalitional presidentialism than Temer’s. Although
Bolsonaro “only” included ﬁve parties in his inaugural cabinet, most seats went to nonpartisans (including several military leaders), and he nominated just two women. Thus, as
analyses of different presidencies show, while the size of portfolio allocations – particularly those under presidential discretion – drives selectors’ capacity for nominating
women ministers, such opportunities are often foregone by leaders who lack the will
to prioritise descriptive representation. Selectors must therefore have both the will and
capacity for constructing descriptively representative cabinets.10
More broadly, in multiparty presidential systems, institutional and partisan concerns
constrain presidents in the cabinet formation and management processes, and those
constraints have negative implications for women’s ministerial prospects.
Although coalitional presidentialism can improve governability amidst multiparty coalitions,
it may come at the cost of representativeness. Brazil’s highly fragmented party system and
unstable coalitions potentially make it an extreme case, but the gendered dynamics we
uncover are likely to apply to presidential systems beyond Brazil.
For example, in Colombia, nearly half (46 per cent) of Álvaro Uribe’s inaugural
cabinet in 2002 were women (United Nations Development Programme, 2012: 17); similarly, in Chile, Michelle Bachelet was celebrated for nominating a parity inaugural
cabinet (where women occupied 48 per cent of the seats) in 2006 (Nyrup and
Bramwell, 2020). At face value, these cases may seem to challenge our ﬁndings. Yet,
as Uribe’s and Bachelet’s respective popularities decreased with time in ofﬁce and governability was at stake, both presidents shufﬂed out women ministers, replacing them
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with men party leaders. When Uribe left ofﬁce in 2010, only 15 per cent of cabinet seats
were occupied by women; when Bachelet left ofﬁce in 2010, only six of her
twenty-six-seat cabinet were women (23 per cent) (Franceschet, 2016).
By contrast, under Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua has managed to not only maintain the
ninth position in the world ranking of women’s parliamentary representation, but also
to maintain high levels of women’s cabinet representation. When inaugurated in 2007,
six of Ortega’s seventeen ministers (35 per cent) were women (Nyrup and Bramwell,
2020). As of April 2021, Nicaragua has a gender-balanced cabinet, in which ten of the
twenty ministers are women (World Economic Forum, 2021). Critically, unlike
Colombia, Chile, or Brazil, Ortega’s cabinet is not a multiparty cabinet: all cabinet
members are either independents with no partisan afﬁliation or members of the president’s party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, reinforcing our ﬁnding that
women’s cabinet representation is more likely under the president’s portfolios.11 These
examples supplement the above analyses to illustrate the insights gained by gendering
the study of coalitional presidentialism for our understanding of cabinet formation and
management in Latin America. However, there is regional variation in the use of
cabinet allocation as a tool of governance in presidential systems (Chaisty et al.,
2014). Understanding how this variation may impact women’s descriptive representation
in presidential systems beyond Latin America also offers a fruitful area of research.
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Notes
1. Inﬂated cabinets may also be cabinets with ministries with less prestige or smaller budgets
(Zucco et al., 2019).
2. Nyrup and Bramwell (2020) have recently launched the Who Governs cross-national dataset on
cabinet members, which offers minister-level data on gender and party afﬁliation.
3. This excludes interim ministers – both interinos and those designated as occupying the post
interinamente (Biblioteca da Presidência, n.d.; Presidencia, 2020).
4. We use candidate-level data published by the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.
5. We acknowledge the limitations of this coding decision, which conﬂates long-time party
members with recent/temporary afﬁliates, and conﬂates non-partisan appointees that typically
bring relevant skills and background to their post with appointees who are simply conﬁdants of
the president (Inácio, 1985). Future work should more carefully examine the salience of ministers’ biographical characteristics for coalition formation and management.
6. Appendix B shows descriptive statistics for key characteristics of inaugural cabinets, including
fragmentation.
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7. In our dataset, left-right ideology ranges from −0.900 to 0.900.
8. For a list of all women ministers, see Appendix C.
9. While not part of the formalized presidential coalition (base aliada), her party (DEM) was a
key partner in the president’s government and in Congress.
10. In a recent interview about his bid for the presidency in 2022, Lula stated that, if elected, he
would seek to nominate a cabinet with parity based on gender and race (Rodrigues, 2022).
Our results suggest that achieving this would depend not only on will but also on capacity.
11. Democratic backsliding under Ortega at once enhances his capacity (fewer constraints) and will
(reputational gains) to include women in his cabinet, and thereby deﬂect critiques about his
administration.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics

Woman
Portfolios
Cabinet size
Days since inauguration
Women congress
Left-right ideology
Rousseff
Gendered cabinet
Presidential discretion
Inaugural

Mean

Standard deviation

Min.

Max.

N

0.077
14.178
30.151
294.065
6.444
−0.045
0.233
4.424
0.690
0.538

0.267
9.423
7.039
428.464
3.613
0.479
0.423
4.517
0.463
0.499

0
1
12
0
0
−0.900
0
0
0
0

1
24
39
1608
14
0.908
1
14
1
1

597
597
597
597
597
597
597
597
597
597

Appendix B. Key Characteristics of Inaugural Cabinets
Presidency
Sarney
Collor
Itamar Franco
Cardoso I
Cardoso II
Lula I
Lula II
Rousseff I
Rousseff II
Temer
Bolsonaro

Cabinet
fragmentation

Cabinet size

Presidential
discretion

Women
ministers

4
4
6
5
6
9
8
7
9
10
5

28
22
27
29
33
32
32
36
37
24
21

25
15
15
24
24
24
24
24
24
12
15

0
2
0
1
1
4
4
9
6
0
2

Note: Data are calculated using inaugural cabinets.
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Appendix C. List of Women Ministers, by Portfolio Type
Gender type

Category

Minister

Masculine/Neutral

Agriculture/Fisheries/Livestock

Katia Abreu
Tereza Cristina
Ideli Salvatti
Helena Chagas
Dilma Rousseff
Marina Silva
Izabella Teixeira
Miriam Belchior
Zélia Cardoso de Mello
Claudia Maria Costin
Suzana Dieckmann Jeolas e Jeolas
Luiza Erundina de Sousa
Erenice Guerra
Grace Mendonca
Dilma Rousseff
Ideli Salvatti
Marta Suplicy
Dorothea Werneck
Gleisi Hoffman
Ines da Silva Magalhaes
Anna de Hollanda
Marta Suplicy
Damares Alves

Communication/Information
Energy
Environment
Finance/Economy

Government/Interior/Home Affairs

Industry/Commerce/Tourism
Planning/Development
Feminin/Neutral

Culture
Human Rights/Racial Equality/Women’s
Affairs

Social Welfare

Note: Categories follow Krook and O’Brien (2012).
Ministers serving more than one term are indicated in bold.
Ministers serving in new ministries are indicated in italics.

Luiza de Bairros
Emilia Fernandes
Nilcea Freire
Nilma Lino Gomes
Iriny Lopes
Eleonora Menicucci
Matilde Ribeiro
Maria do Rosario
Ideli Salvatti
Luislinda Valois
Tereza Campello
Margarida Maria Maia Procopio
Benedita da Silva

